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This paper presents new evidence on how the annuitization decision is affected by changes in 
the annuity’s value. We take advantage of an unprecendented change in policy, which in 2004 
moderated the super-mandatory Swiss occupational pension scheme: The 20 percent 
reduction in the rate at which retirement capital is translated into a life-long annuity equates to 
a net present value loss of approximately 20’000 SFR (20’000 US$) for the average retiree. 
Using administrative data and correcting for anticipation effects, we show that due to the 
change in policy there was an approximately 8 percentage point change in the share of men 
choosing to annuitize their savings. We also show that the estimated responsiveness of the 
cash-out decision to variations in a utility based measure for the annuity value is comparable 
to results of previous studies, which employed completely different sources of variation in the 
annuity’s value. 
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Economic theory predicts that most people should annuitize, but when inter 
national numbers are analyzed it is apparent that when given a choice, only a
minority do so voluntarily. This raises questions with regard to the adequacy of
income provided in old age in many countries: As a consequence of unfavorable
demographic and ﬁnancially imbalanced social security systems, public pension
annuity payments are declining and fully funded systems which typically do not
mandate annuitization are playing a greater role.
The lack of voluntary annuitization is also puzzling given the numerous the 
oretical ﬁndings following the seminal paper of (Yaari (1965)), which all suggest
sizeable beneﬁts to annuitization. A great amount of literature has attempted
to shed light on the “annuity puzzle” (see Brown (2007) for an excellent review
of this literature), but it has failed to present a convincing general explanation.
While adverse selection, administrative loads, the existence of ﬁrst pillar annu 
ities, intra family risk sharing, bequest motives,1 and a desire to insure against
expenditure spikes can rationalize the preference for the lump sum to some de 
gree, the low annuitization rates remain hard to reconcile with economic theory.
Recent work on the determinants of individual cash out behavior includes not
fully rational behavior.2
Given the very low level of voluntary annuitization observed in the real world,
the puzzle’s solution is even more diﬃcult due to the lack of suitable data. Em 
pirical evidence that clearly identiﬁes the determinants of the cash out decision at
retirement are thus scarce. Notable exceptions are Hurd et al. (1998) on pension
cash outs when changing jobs or retiring, Brown (2001) analyzing ex ante inten 
tions to annuitize, and Bütler and Teppa (2007) on the annuitization decision in
the context of the mandatory Swiss occupational pension scheme.
This paper analyzes the annuitization decision at retirement taking advan 
tage of an unprecedented and sudden change in conversion rates recently im 
plemented in Switzerland. In 2004, most large insurance companies (covering
approximately 10% of the work force) reduced their conversion rates by almost
20%. These conversion rates are used to calculate a life  long annuity based on the
1In a recent working paper Lockwood (2008) presents microsimulations that demonstrate
that the bequest motive might be able to explain low annuitization rates.
2See, for example, Brown et al. (2008) who ﬁnd that people are more likely to annuitize
when the choice is presented to them in a consumption framework than when it is presented in
an investment framework.
3accumulated retirement capital in the super mandatory part of the second pillar
Super mandatory pensions represent a considerable part of retirement income in
Switzerland, providing approximately 20 percent of total retirement income for
an average retiree. Reducing the conversion rate as was done here is equivalent
to a loss in present value of 20’000 SFR (≈$ 20’000) for an average individual.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the ﬁrst to analyze such a large and
truly exogenous variation in the annuity price. With this we establish a causal
relationship between annuity values and cash out behavior. The annuitization
decision is analyzed using the administrative records of several Swiss insurance
companies that provide occupational pension plans to small and middle sized
ﬁrms that represent all branches in the economy. The data includes approxi 
mately 6’000 individual annuitization decisions made between the years of 2001
and 2005, and provides reliable and complete information on pension plan details.
Our setup evades the issue of individual self selection into ﬁrms/plans based on
unobserved characteristics, as well as the problem of omitted variables, which
would impede the identiﬁcation of the price eﬀect.
A fraction of the individuals who had planned to retire after the policy change
obviously anticipated the change and retired earlier in order to proﬁt from the
higher annuity. This is evident in the sharp increase in the number of annuitants
in the months just preceding the conversion rate reduction. Due to this antici 
pation eﬀect, a simple comparison of the cash out behavior before and after the
policy change is likely to overestimate the eﬀect of the policy change. In order to
address this problem of potential anticipation we make use of the fact that the
cost of retiring earlier is related to the diﬀerence in age between that of just before
the policy change and the statutory retirement date. This allows us to construct
a good proxy for the likelihood an individual proactively anticipates the change
in policy. Once this anticipation is accounted for, we observe a constant annu 
itization rate before the policy change and an approximately 8 percentage point
drop in annuitization in the year after the change. The annuitization rate also
remains constant in the periods preceding the reform and following the change,
respectively, when the anticipation component is ﬁltered out.
While the approach to regress the annuitization decision on individual con 
trols and a dummy indicating the policy change is straightforward, it has two
shortcomings. First, it does not include any measure for the annuity’s value,
which would allow us to calculate the value’s elasticity in the annuitization de 
cision. Second, the only source of identiﬁcation comes from the variation in
4annuity value over time. Yet, the annuity value also varies across individuals. To
address these points, we construct a utility based measure of the annuity value
(as pioneered in Brown (2001)), and include it as an additional regressor. We
ﬁnd that a one percentage point increase in annuity equivalent wealth increases
the annuitization rate by approximately 0.8 percentage points, after controlling
for anticipation. This estimate is remarkably similar to estimates derived under
completely diﬀerent conditions (Brown (2001) and Bütler and Teppa (2007)).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the key features of the
Swiss social security system and the change in policy. Section 3 describes the
data set and analyzes the macroeconomic environment. Section 4 outlines the
theoretical and empirical strategy to analyze the eﬀects of the policy change.
Section 5 presents the results and the conclusion is presented in section 6.
2 The Swiss social security system and pension
plan details
2.1 The importance of the second pillar
Switzerland’s pension system is made up of three pillars, in which the ﬁrst and
second are more or less equally important.3 The ﬁrst pillar is a predominantly
pay as you go (PAYG) system and aims at providing a basic subsistence level of
income to all retired residents in Switzerland. To some degree, beneﬁts depend
on the number of years contributed and the average working income, although in
reality the beneﬁt structure is relatively ﬂat. The statutory retirement age is 65
for men and 64 for women. At the earliest men may claim ﬁrst piller beneﬁts at
63 and women at 62 (at actuarially fair reductions in pension beneﬁts).4
The second pillar, introduced on January 1, 1985, is an employer based, fully
funded occupational pension scheme and is mandatory for all employees whose
annual income exceeds a certain minimum. The third pillar is earmarked and
3However, a detailed description of all of the characteristics of the Swiss social security
system is beyond the scope of this paper. The interested reader is referred to Queisser and
Vittas (2000) (especially concerning institutional details), and Bütler (2004) (for the second
pillar).
4Retirement at 65/64 is not mandatory by law, but rather the age of 65 for men or 64 for
women is the condition of eligibility for claiming public pension beneﬁts. Most labor contracts
specify a retirement age that coincides with the age of eligibility.
5beneﬁts from tax preferential treatment. For the case in which the combined
pension income is not enough to cover basic needs in old age, means tested sup 
plemental beneﬁts may also be claimed. These additional beneﬁts usually result
in an income that is well above the poverty threshold. In 2004 89.4 percent of
working men and 71.1 percent of working women were involved in an occupational
pension plan, which corresponds to 81.2 percent of the total workforce. An em 
ployer can choose between diﬀerent organizational structures for its occupational
pension plan. These range from setting up a completely autonomous pension
fund, which covers all risks to outsourcing the scheme entirely to an insurance
company. The latter is relatively common particularly for small and medium
sized companies.
The main goal of the occupational pension system is to maintain pre retirement
income in addition to beneﬁts from the ﬁrst pillar. It insures income above that
level that is covered by the ﬁrst pillar.5 Most pension funds aim at a total replace 
ment rate of approximately 50 60 percent of insured income, including income
from the ﬁrst pillar. The net replacement rate after taxes often amounts to 70 80
percent for an uninterrupted career even for higher categories of income, and can
reach 100 percent for beneﬁciaries with dependent children.
The insured income above the lower threshold and below the upper threshold6
is called the mandatory component, and the income above the upper threshold
is called the super-mandatory component of the second pillar. Pension insurers
are required by law to insure the mandatory share. They are free to provide
insurance for the super mandatory share, but virtually all do. This is mainly a
consequence of the second pillar being thought of as an important attribute in
attracting a well educated workforce to Switzerland’s tight labor market.
The mandatory part of the second pillar is subject to stringent regulation with
respect to minimum contribution rates, minimum interest rates and the rate at
which the accumulated pension wealth is translated into an annuity. Although
most pension plans are set up on a deﬁned contribution base, the income guar 
antees (minimum accrual and interest rates, conversion factor) mandated by law
make the deﬁned beneﬁt and contribution schemes in practice very similar. The
federal law is less restrictive with respect to the contract conditions oﬀered by
5In 2004 the threshold was approximately 20’000 SFR (≈ $ 20’000). The threshold explains
the lower rate of coverage for women, who often work part-time and thus on average earn less.
6The upper threshold is equal to three times the yearly maximum single ﬁrst pillar pension
(i.e. 75’960 SFR or $ 56’220 in 2004).
6the insurance companies in the super mandatory part. The minimum interest
rate in the super mandatory part, which is set by the pension fund, is normally
lower than the minimum interest rate in the mandatory part and can be adjusted
according to fund performance.
The accrued capital is fully transferable when the individual changes employ 
ers. By law, when an employee goes from one company to another he receives
all of the accumulated contributions (including the employer’s part), but the full
sum has to be paid into a new fund. The total amount of assets at retirement
has thus been accumulated over the entire working lifetime and is a good proxy
for lifetime income.
2.2 Options to withdrawal of the Swiss second pillar
The accumulated retirement capital can be withdrawn either as a monthly life 
long annuity (including a 60 percent survivor beneﬁt), a lump sum or a mix of
the two options. In some plans the cash out limit is equal to 50 or 25 percent
(the legal minimum) of accumulated capital. The individual must declare his
choice between three months and three years prior to the eﬀective withdrawal
date depending on insurer regulations. Many pension insurers deﬁne a default
option for the case when the beneﬁciary does not make an active choice.
Occupational pension annuities are strictly proportional to the accumulated
retirement assets (contributions made during the working lifetime plus accrued
interest). The capital K is translated into a yearly pension B using the so 
called conversion rate γ: B = γK. The conversion rate is independent of marital
status, but depends on retirement age and gender. The law stipulates a minimum
conversion rate, which is currently 7.1 percent but was equal to 7.2 percent until
2004 and 7.15 percent in 2005.7 In the super mandatory part, pension insurers
are free to set the conversion factor.
A majority of retirees covered by Swiss occupational pension plans choose
the annuity, despite the ﬁrst pillar already providing an annuity stream covering
subsistence needs in old age and lump sums proﬁting from preferential tax treat 
ment in many cantons (the Swiss states). In a related paper, Bütler and Teppa
(2007) analyze the annuitization decision at retirement, making use of variations
in the annuity’s value caused by diﬀerences in company pension plans. They
show that the annuity’s value is the most important determinant in the cash out
7The conversion rate will be lowered continuously to 6.8 percent in 2015.
7decision, but that there are also great diﬀerences between companies. Individuals
often choose the standard option oﬀered by the company or seem to follow their
peers. Small stocks of old age capital are much more likely to be withdrawn as
lump sums. This is probably a consequence of the fact that for small amounts of
capital, it may be optimal to spend all resources in order to qualify for means 
tested social assistance. As in other studies, Bütler and Teppa (2007) ﬁnd mixed
evidence for the existence of a bequest motive. This in large part is due to the
limited amount of information they had on individual backgrounds in their data.8
In light of some recent behavioral explanations for the low demand for annu 
ities (such as Brown et al. (2008)), the unusually high degree of annuitization in
Switzerland may be attributed to the prevailing framing in the scheme: By law,
pension insurers must provide each year all of their insurees with a statement in
which not only the accumulated capital to date is reported, but also the expected
anticipated annuity stream (based on an extrapolation of current earnings and
interest rates). Although the accumulated capital is reported on the statement,
the space dedicated to annuity streams (including survivor beneﬁts and disability
beneﬁts) is much bigger. The statement thus comes close to what Brown et al.
(2008) call a consumption frame.
3 Data
Our data set consists of administrative records of individuals covered by occupa 
tional pension plans provided by large Swiss insurance companies. The private
ﬁrms which outsource their second pillars to these insurance companies are typ 
ically small and are active in several branches of the economy. The sample is
restricted to deﬁned contributions (DC) plans. The data is a repeated cross 
section, each individual is only observed once at retirement. For the companies
in our sample, we were given information about all employees who retired be 
tween 2001 to 2005. We use the records for the years 2001 to 2003 as the “before”
period and those for 2004 and 2005 as the “after” period.
In the analysis we will focus on men for two reasons. First, the retirement age
for women was raised twice over the period of interest (in 2001 from 62 to 63 and
8Bütler and Teppa (2007) report that divorced and widowed men (who are much more likely
to have children) have a higher propensity to cash-out than singles at the margin, although the
former have a higher remarriage rate and should therefore choose the annuity more often. This
ﬁnding may be interpreted as an indicator for the existence of a bequest motive.
8in 2005 from 63 to 64). Second, women generally have a much lower amount of
capital stock in the super mandatory part and are thus aﬀected much less by the
decrease in the annuity’s value. We also exclude from our sample 44 individuals
with a total capital stock more than 1’500’000 SFR. Men with a higher capital
stock are likely to be covered by supplementary insurance for managers. The
chosen threshold corresponds to approximately four times the average second
pillar capital stock at retirement as calculated in Bütler and Teppa (2007). We
also drop 37 individuals who retired before reaching the age of 60. Retirement
before age 60 is very unusual for the companies in our sample and is often an
indication of poor health or a diﬃcult employment situation. The ﬁnal sample
thus consists of 5’855 men, with retirement ages between 60 and 70.
For each individual we have information on their date of birth, retirement
date, annuitization decision, amount of accumulated capital stock, name of em 
ployer, earnings in the last year before retirement, as well as the individual speciﬁc
conversion factor of the mandatory and super mandatory amounts. For individ 
uals retiring in 2003 and before, we only know their total capital stock, but not
how it’s split up between the mandatory and super mandatory parts. However,
the imputation of the amount in the super mandatory part is straightforward and
not sensitive to the chosen method. 9
Nonetheless, the data suﬀer from a number of shortcomings. In particular, the
insurance companies do not collect any information on non pension wealth, mar 
ital status, education, health, occupation, or other indicators of socioeconomic
status, even though such factors are likely to be related to the risk of mortality.
As long as we have no reason to believe that these factors diﬀer in a signiﬁcant
way from one year to the next, neglecting them should not critically aﬀect our
results.
3.1 Pension plan details and the policy change
The insurance companies in our sample provide insurance for both the mandatory
and the super mandatory parts of pension plans. The statutory age of retirement
is set at 65 for men. Early retirement, starting at age 55, as well as working
9To calculate the amount of super-mandatory capital we used the estimated amount of
super-mandatory capital as a function of the retiree’s age and his total capital stock with the
estimates taken from the 2004/5 retirees. Details about this imputation strategy can be found
in the appendix. We also experimented with other ways to impute the super-mandatory share,
but experienced little sensitivity as to the method of imputation.
9beyond planned retirement is possible. With regard to early retirement, the
conversion rate is reduced by approximately 3 percent for each month, while it
is raised by around 2 percent per month if retirement occurs after the statutory
retirement age. At retirement the individual can choose between an annuity, a
full lump sum or a mixture of the two. The insurance companies in our sample
require three months advance notice in making a decision and force individuals
to make a timely decision (no defaulting).
Until the end of 2003 conversion rates of the mandatory and super mandatory
parts coincided with the statutory proposed conversion rates, despite the fact
that the insurance companies were free to set the conversion rate of the super 
mandatory part. According to the insurance companies, these high conversion
rates threatened to create losses in the future. As a consequence, in 2003 most
large insurance companies decided to drastically reduce their conversion rates of
the super mandatory part by January 2004, arguing that due to the demographic
change and the increase in life expectancy, annuities have become too generous
compared to the individual contributions. For a man retiring at age 65 the
conversion rate was reduced from 7.2 percent to 5.835 percent and for a woman
retiring at age 62 from 7.2 percent to 5.454 percent.10 The reduction in the
conversion rates was almost the same for all insurance companies. According
to the insurance companies, this is because they based their calculations on the
same mortality table.11 The policy change was announced 7 months before it
became eﬀective, i.e., in June 2003, and was extensively discussion in the media.
3.2 Descriptive analysis
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the most important variables in our data
set. Prior to the policy change, i.e. for 2001 to 2003, the conversion rate in the
mandatory and super mandatory part match and are practically constant over
time. In 2004 and 2005 the conversion factor in the super mandatory part is on
10The diﬀerence in conversion rates between men and women is the result of a lower female
retirement age not a diﬀerence in longevity. As the survivor component of the second pillar is
free, men and women cost approximately the same for the pension insurer provided they retire
at the same age.
11Calculations of the adjusted conversion rates were based on a life expectancy of 83 years
for men and 89 years for women.
10average 18 percentage points lower than in the mandatory part.12 The average
retirement age remained fairly constant across the diﬀerent years: 72.1 percent
of all men in our sample retire at the statutory age of 65.
Approximately two thirds of the total accumulated capital is in the mandatory
part and one third in the super mandatory part. A large fraction of the beneﬁcia 
ries chose a polar option (full lump sum or full annuity) and did not distinguish
between the mandatory and super mandatory part of the insurance, although the
implicit annuity prices are dramatically diﬀerent after 2003. Between 56.6 72.7
percent of all men chose a lump sum depending, another 25.5 39.4 percent chose
full annuitization, whereas only 1.9 4.0 percent opted for a mixed option. The
percentage of annuitants fell considerably in 2004, thereby providing the ﬁrst
evidence that the policy change had an eﬀect on cash out behavior.
Table 1
The average stock of capital in the super mandatory part is much higher in
2003 prior to the policy change. This jump in super mandatory capital is accom 
panied by a greater number of retirees, a slightly lower than average retirement
age, an upward jump in pre retirement wage and a higher annuitization rate.
Taken together, the numbers indicate that the policy change may have triggered
not only a higher cash out rate, but also a shift in retirement to take advantage
of the advantageous conditions prior to the change for those most aﬀected by the
reform.
Figure 1 below provides additional evidence for potential anticipation eﬀects.
Not less than 26 percent of all retirees in 2003 retired in December 2003, and
December 2003 is the only month, in which the annuity is chosen more often than
the lump sum. Individuals thus seem to have been aware of the policy change
and possibly adjusted their behavior accordingly. Not taking this anticipation
eﬀect into account could potentially cause an upward bias of the impact of the
policy change on cash out behavior.
12It should be noted that the data is not representative for the Swiss second pillar. The
individuals in the sample are on average poorer as measured by their accumulated pension
wealth, retire approximately 2 years later and choose to cash-out much more often. These
statistics mirror the fact that insurance companies in general provide second pillar plans for
smaller ﬁrms with a less educated workforce. Unlike many other countries, well educated and
high income workers tend to retire at an earlier age than their less educated and lower paid
colleagues. This most likely is a consequence of very high replacement rates in the second pillar
for high income workers (Bütler et al. (2004)).
11Figure 1
3.3 The environment of the policy change
An important concern in our setup is that other institutional and macroeconomic
factors relevant for the annuitization decision might have changed about the same
time as the change in policy. The insurance companies in our sample did not
report any other changes to retirement plans for men during the period. Neither
did the occupational pension law for men change.
As for the macroeconomic environment, things are more complicated. Unfor 
tunately, data from other insurance companies that did not reduce their conver 
sion rates and could potentially be used as a control group to account for changes
in the economic environment are not available. The implied conversion factor of
the most popular (two life) annuities oﬀered in the very small unregulated mar 
ket stayed practically constant over the entire period. However, these annuities
constitute a poor benchmark, due to the very thin market in which they oper 
ate. Under these circumstances, our strategy is to control for all macroeconomic
factors that are relevant for the annuitization decision. In the ﬁnal analysis inter 
est rates are the only macroeconomic variables we kept. Other macroeconomic
indicators such as the unemployment rate varied very little over the period of
analysis or were not available at monthly frequencies.
If people expect future interest rates to rise, (risk less) investment oppor 
tunities yield a higher payoﬀ and hence the lump sum option becomes more
attractive.13 To capture changes in the yield curve we compute the mortality
adjusted present value of an annual income stream for a 65 year old single man
until the end of his life for each month in our dataset. Multiplied by the conver 
sion factor, this measure — denoted by PV(income) in the tables — yields the
money’s worth ratio of a constant annuity for a single men.14
13Milevsky (1998) argues that one of the reasons for the weak demand for voluntary annuities
is the individual draw towards investing in risky assets in order to receive higher expected
returns.
14We use nominal yields on Treasury bonds with maturities of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 20 and
30 years reported by the Swiss National Bank (SNB (2007)) to calculate the expected nominal
short rate in each future period. Data on mortality rates are based on the mortality tables
created by the Swiss Federal Statistical Oﬃce (Kohli (2005)) over the period 1998-2003. We
have also experimented with other summary measures for potential investment yields. However,
the estimation results were not sensitive as to the yield measure employed.
12Figure 2 presents the conversion rate at retirement age 65 (right scale), the
conversion rate at age 65 adjusted for the yield curve in the super mandatory
part (right scale) together with the monthly share of individuals taking a lump
sum (left scale). The conversion rate in the super mandatory part fell from 7.2
percent in December 2003 to 5.845 percent in January 2004. Over the same
period the fraction of individuals taking the full or partial lump sum increased
from 46.2 percent to 84.7 percent. From mid 2004 to mid 2005 interest rates fell
by almost one percent on average, representing an increase in the yield adjusted
conversion rate. The recovery in the annuitization rate as shown in Figure 2 and
also evident from Table 1 (over the same period the percentage of annuitants rose
by around 8 percentage points) can be seen as informal evidence for the relevance
of interest rates for the annuitization decision.
Figure 2
4 Theory and empirical strategy
The (money) value of an annuity is determined essentially by the conversion rate
and the relevant interest rates at the time of retirement. The 19 percent reduction
in the conversion rate of the super mandatory part is thus accompanied by an
equal net present value loss of the annuity relative to the lump sum. For the
average male retiree at age 65, the decrease in the net present value of the beneﬁt
stream amounted to approximately 20’000 SFR (≈$ 20’000). Before the policy
change a conversion rate of 7.2 percent would have generated a yearly annuity
payment of 7’920 SFR in the super mandatory part; afterwards the applicable
conversion rate of 5.835 percent only yielded a yearly pension of 6’420 SFR.
Individuals with a higher capital stock in the super mandatory part are more
aﬀected by the policy change in absolute terms. Therefore, we can expect the
impact of the policy change on the cash out behavior to be strongest among
those individuals. We should observe no reaction to the policy change among
individuals with zero or negligible amounts in the super mandatory part of the
system.
Based on the results of previous studies, we also expect a higher probability
to cash out retirement wealth for those with low capital stocks. The main reason
for that behavior lies in the availability of social assistance in the form of supple 
mental beneﬁts. This is true because an annuity, even a small one, is detrimental
13to the eligibility for income support.
Prior to its adoption, the policy change had been subject to extensive discus 
sions in the media. As a consequence, the policy change and its consequences
became public knowledge and we can expect that some people may have chosen
to retire earlier to beneﬁt from the higher conversion rate. This is particularly
true for individuals that had planned to retire not too long after the policy change
and wanted to annuitize their accumulated assets at the pre reform conversion
rate. Ignoring the anticipation eﬀect will lead to biased estimates of the eﬀects of
the policy change; strategies to deal with anticipation eﬀects are outlined below.
4.1 Before and after comparison
A straightforward way to analyze the eﬀects of the policy change is to compare
the behavior before with the behavior after the policy change. This comparison
is done estimating a regression in the form
LUi = f(α + βAFTERi + x
′
iγ + ǫi) (1)
where LUi is a dummy, which takes the value of 1 if the individual chooses the
lump sum or a mixed option and 0 in the case of an annuity.15 AFTERi indi 
cates whether the individual was aﬀected by the policy change and xi is a set of
covariates for person i (accumulated total capital stock in 100’000 SFR, square of
accumulated capital stock, last wage, and age dummies). To account for changes
in the economic environment (in particular, the fact that alternative investment
opportunities potentially inﬂuence the annuitization decision), we include the
summary measure for bond yields at the time of retirement, PV(income). In our
regression framework, the coeﬃcient of interest β therefore measures the eﬀect of
the policy change on the cash out behavior of men in our sample.
In the tables we report the coeﬃcients of a linear probability model. We also
run regressions with probit and two sided Tobit models. The resulting eﬀects
from these latter models are very close to the coeﬃcients estimated with a simple
linear probability model.
15The reasoning behind this strategy is that in the case of a mixed option the insurance
companies pay out the annuity from the mandatory capital and the lump sum on the remaining
capital. Therefore, choosing a mixed option is equivalent to choosing a lump sum in the super-
mandatory part.
144.2 Anticipation eﬀects
Potential anticipators are individuals who will turn 65 shortly after the policy
change, and have some of their pension wealth in the super mandatory part of
the occupational pension plan. Anticipating retirement comes at the cost of losing
additional contribution months and years that would have led to both a higher
amount of capital stock and a higher annuity. Taken together and neglecting
the disutility of labor, both the utility value of the lump sum and annuity are
increasing with the age of retirement, as depicted schematically in Figure 3. The
decrease in the conversion rate leads to a discontinuous fall in the utility value of
the annuity, but not of the lump sum.
The individual foresees an earlier retirement if the utility value of the annuity
just before the policy change exceeds the utility value of the chosen payout option
at the statutory retirement age. A diﬀerentiation can be made between three
cases, of which two are presented in Figure 3. First, individuals whose valuation
of the annuity before the policy change does not signiﬁcantly exceed that of the
lump and who would cash out after the policy change (see upper panel in Figure 3)
These individuals can be expected to retire earlier provided they are close to the
statutory retirement age: The higher the pre reform ratio between the value of
the annuity and the lump sum, the more likely is an earlier retirement. The
second case is similar to the ﬁrst, but deals with individuals who would have
annuitized even after the loss in the annuity’s value (see lower panel in Figure 3).
Again these individuals are more likely to retire earlier. The third case concerns
individuals who would have chosen the lump sum even before the change and are
thus clearly not susceptible to an anticipation eﬀect.
Figure 3
4.2.1 Ad hoc correction of anticipation eﬀects
The ﬁrst strategy to deal with potential anticipation eﬀects is to use an ad 
hoc correction of potential anticipators’ behavior: Instead of taking their chosen
retirement date (which corresponds to the one or two months immediately pre 
ceding the policy) for the year by year comparisons, we make them retire either
at the statutory retirement age of 65 or in the year 2004 (the year after the policy
change). This procedure should provide us with reasonable bounds as to the ef 
fect of the policy change. A drawback of this procedure is that although potential
15anticipators can easily be identiﬁed — individuals retiring early with a positive
amount in the super mandatory part —, some of those who retired early in late
2003 might have done so even in the absence of the conversion rate change.
To illustrate the implications of the proposed strategy let LU0 and LU1 be the
fraction of individuals taking the lump sum under the retirement conditions before
and after the policy change. Without any loss of generality we assume that the
number of retirees in the absence of anticipation is equal in the two periods and
normalized to 1. Had the reform come as a surprise, we could simply compute
∆true = LU1 − LU0 to quantify the impact of the reform on the annuitization
decision. As outlined above, however, there are two groups of people likely to
retire earlier to beneﬁt from a higher annuity value before the policy change (see
also Figure 3): Let AA and AL denote the anticipators (measured as a fraction
of all retirees after the policy change) who would have chosen the annuity and




1 − AL − AA
−
LU0
1 + AL + AA
,
which clearly shows that this measure is biased.
If we were able to correctly identify anticipators (AA + AL), but unable to
distinguish between the two groups, we could compute upper and lower bounds
for the policy eﬀect as follows: An upper bound for the impact can be found
by letting all anticipators choose the lump sum after the policy change, ∆ =
(LU1 + AA) − LU0 > ∆true, a lower bound by letting the anticipators choose the
annuity, ∆ = (LU1−AL)−LU0 < ∆true. We deﬁne an upper bound as the greater
impact of a change in policy (choosing a lump sum instead of a reduced annuity)
, and a lower bound of impact as no reaction to the change in policy (allowing the
anticipators to be satisﬁed with the reduced annuity). The higher the fraction of
anticipators, the wider the bounds will be. The same strategy would also deliver
bounds for other year by year comparisons of annuitization rates.
Unfortunately, this ad hoc strategy is susceptible to individuals who are falsely
identiﬁed as anticipators. It can be shown that if there are not too many false
anticipators, the bounds still contain the true eﬀect,16 but the gap between the
bounds widens and the strategy delivers worse bounds for other year by year
comparisons.








164.2.2 Proxy for the likelihood to anticipate
Ideally, if we knew who anticipated (retired earlier) as a reaction to the future
decrease in the annuity’s value, we would simply add the information a as an
additional regressor in the estimation. But, unfortunately, this information is
unavailable because not all of those individuals retiring earlier just before the
change do so because of the policy change. The second strategy is to construct
a suitable proxy z for the unobserved anticipation and earlier retirement decision
a. Such a proxy has to satisfy two conditions:17
1. z must be redundant, i.e., in a conditional sense z is irrelevant in explaining
the choice of the pay out option, once anticipation a and other covariates
x have been controlled for.
2. z’s relation to the anticipation and earlier retirement decision a should be
close enough so that once z is included in the estimation equation, the
covariates x are not partially correlated with a.
From the graphical analysis drawn in Figure 3 it follows immediately that the
cost of not anticipating and retiring earlier increases with the age of potential
anticipators at the time of the policy change. The cost is 0 for people turning 65
before the policy change, jumps to a maximum for people who turn 65 just after
the change and then decreases with the increasing time span between the policy
change and the date of the statutory retirement age of a potential anticipator.
The individual has to balance the advantages of anticipating the policy change
and retiring earlier (thus beneﬁting from a higher pre change conversion rate)
against the cost of extra contribution years that are forgone when retiring early.
Following the visual presentation in Figure 4, we take as a base proxy a maximal
cost (assumed to be 10) minus the number of years between the policy change
and the date of retirement at the statutory age 65, i.e., a maximal cost minus the
number of years for which additional contributions are forfeited for those who are
aﬀected by the reform (0 otherwise).
The chosen proxy satisﬁes the ﬁrst requirement. Given the value of the annu 
ity relative to the lump sum and the age of the individual, the time span between
the date of the policy change and the individual’s 65th birthday is redundant for
the choice of the option. For the second requirement — the correlation between
17See Wooldridge (2002) (Section 4.3.) for details concerning the properties of the estimators
when using proxies for omitted variables.
17the omitted anticipated earlier retirement decision a and each of the covariates
x proxy is zero once we partial out for z — it can be argued that all true antic 
ipators (a = 1) are picked up by the proxy variable. However, anticipated early
retirement is not only driven by the length of the anticipated early retirement pe 
riod, but also by the magnitude of the anticipated beneﬁt per period. The latter
is directly related to the size of the capital stock in the super mandatory part.
Taken alone, the proxy z as depicted in Figure 4 might not be fully informative.
To capture the impact of the super mandatory capital stock on the anticipated
earlier retirement decision, we also interact the proxy with the size of the capital
stock in the super mandatory part. To account for the fact that the utility value
of the annuity does not increase linearly with the super mandatory capital, we
also include its square interacted with the proxy. Note that if the base proxy
does not have a zero mean in the population (which is obviously not the case
here), OLS does not consistently estimate the size of the policy impact. As we do
not know its population mean, we demean the proxy variable before interacting it
with the super mandatory capital stock. Once interaction eﬀects with the capital
stock are included, we would expect the base proxy to no longer have an impact
on the choice between the lump sum and the annuity.
Figure 4
4.3 The responsiveness to changes in the annuity’s value
The regression approach taken above allows us to clearly identify the eﬀects of
the policy change, as long as there are no unobservable factors that are correlated
with the cash out behavior and that may have changed with the policy change.
However, this has two shortcomings. First, it makes it impossible to measure the
elasticity of the annuitization decision with respect to the change in the annuity
value, since we have measured only the numerator (the change in the cash out
behavior) but not the denominator (the change in the value of the annuity). The
second drawback is that the value of the annuity depends in a nonlinear way on
the price of the annuity, the individual’s retirement age and his/her accumulated
retirement capital, especially in the presence of ﬁrst pillar annuities.
To address these points, we calculate the annuity equivalent wealth (AEW)
for each individual in our data set. The AEW is a utility based measure of
annuities that has been used in previous studies by Friedman and Warshawsky
(1988), Mitchell et al. (1999), Brown (2001), and Mitchell and McCarthy (2002).
18Using this measure we then estimate regression models of the form:
LUi = f(α + βAEWi + γyeart + x
′
iδ + ei) (2)
where AEWi is equal to the annuity equivalent wealth of individual i, yeart is a
set of retirement year dummies, and xi consists of a set of other covariates, such
as retirement age, wage and a measure for bond yields in the month of retirement.
The coeﬃcient of interest is β, which can be interpreted as the responsiveness of
the demand for the annuity to changes in the annuity’s value.
5 Results
5.1 Before-after comparisons
Simple year by year comparisons are almost certainly plagued by anticipation
decisions. We therefore ﬁrst present some results estimating equation (1) for dif 
ferent quartiles of the wealth distribution separately to account for their diﬀerent
exposures to the policy change. Recall that individuals with no or very little capi 
tal in the super mandatory part should hardly be aﬀected by the change in policy.
The higher the capital stock in the super mandatory part, the greater we can ex 
pect the impact to be. Table 2 clearly conﬁrms these conjectures. The change
in the cash out behavior is strongest among those at the top of the accumulated
super mandatory capital distribution. Among the wealthiest quartile, the share
of men taking a lump sum increases by not less than 35 percentage points from
2003 to 2004. The increase is only 13 percentage points for the second quartile
and drops to around seven percent for the lowest quartile. The share of those
who choose the lump sum decreases by roughly 8.5 and 14 percentage points from
2002 to 2003, in the third and fourth quartile, respectively, but does not change
in a signiﬁcant way for the lower half of the capital distribution. Taken together,
these two comparisons may indicate the presence of anticipation.18
All quartiles show a decrease in the cash out rate by approximately 5 to 10
percentage points from 2004 to 2005. During that period interest rates fell by
almost one percent, increasing the relative attractiveness of the annuity from both
18Even without controlling for anticipation, a higher second pillar capital stock signiﬁcantly
increases the probability of full annuitization (not shown here, but see Table 4). These ﬁndings
are in line with previous empirical studies by Hurd et al. (1998), Brown (2001), and Bütler and
Teppa (2007).
19the mandatory and super mandatory part alike. It is thus not surprising, that
there is little diﬀerence in the response of people in diﬀerent super mandatory
capital quartiles. Changes in interest rates as well as a changing composition
of retirees in the years compared in Table 2, not least as a result of people
advancing their retirement to avoid the lower conversion rate, call for an inclusion
of additional regressors to isolate the eﬀect of the policy change.
5.2 Correcting for anticipation
As outlined in the previous section we adopt two strategies in dealing with an 
ticipated earlier retirement eﬀects. The ﬁrst is an ad hoc correction in which we
treat potential anticipators as if they retired at their statutory retirement age
or simply one year after the change. The results are shown in Table 3, columns
(A1) to (A6). The outcomes of the proxy variable OLS estimations are shown
in Table 4. All speciﬁcations in Tables 3 and 4 include retirement age dummies,
capital, the capital squared, the last wage and a summary measure for interest
rates.
5.2.1 Ad-hoc correction
Table 3 shows that the obtained bands for the true eﬀect are greater when po 
tential anticipators are treated as if they retired the year after the policy change
(columns (A3) and (A4)) and when we also include November 2003 early retirees
as potential anticipators (columns (A5) and (A6)).19 Although prima facie there
is little reason to retire in November 2003 (instead of December 2003), the un 
certainty accompanying the policy change might have induced some individuals
to choose the earlier exit out of the labor market despite the loss of annuity
income. Including November early retirees however renders the strategy more
susceptible to falsely identiﬁed anticipators. This is conﬁrmed by a lower up 
per bound in the 2003/4 comparison and a higher upper bound in the 2002/4
comparison. Moreover, columns (A5) and (A6) show a signiﬁcant increase in the
lump sum withdrawal from 2002 to 2003 (contrary to a fall in the cash out rate
19Moving potential anticipators to the year 2004 probably delivers less reliable estimates
for the lower bound of the policy eﬀect. Once an individual has decided against anticipating
retirement to beneﬁt from the higher conversion rate, it is unlikely she/he chooses to retire
early and take the annuity before the statutory retirement age. The move to 2004 is included
as a robustness check
20without controlling for anticipation), potentially showing an over correction of
the anticipation eﬀect.
Recall that if we assume people stick to the annuity when they can not an 
ticipate the change in policy, the eﬀect of the policy change on the annuitization
decision is eased (this gives us a lower bound of the eﬀect of the policy change).
On the other hand, if people instead cash out their retirement balances, the ef 
fects of the policy change on cash out behavior is ampliﬁed (this is the upper
bound). If individuals would otherwise retire at age 65 and still take the annuity
(columns (A2) and (A6)), the lower bound for the policy change is found to be
small or even insigniﬁcant. However, if we assume that individuals switch to a
lump sum, the eﬀect of the policy change remains signiﬁcant and relatively large.
This is also conﬁrmed by the bounds for the impact of the policy change compar 
ing the years 2002 and 2004 (see in particular the estimates in which anticipators
are shifted to age 65).
All in all, the estimates shown in Table 3 suggest a sizeable eﬀect of the
policy change, about 5 to 10 percentage, points and a relatively constant cash 
out behavior in the periods preceding and following the policy change. Then
again in some cases the bounds are very wide. This is a consequence of both the
large number of anticipators and falsely identiﬁed anticipators. Not all retirees in
December (or November) 2003 who take an annuity and retire before the statutory
retirement age have retired earlier as a consequence of the policy change.
5.2.2 Proxy for anticipation decision
Table 4 reports the estimation results from a linear probability model with and
without a proxy correction for anticipation for the entire duration of our data.
We also experimented with more sophisticated empirical models instead of the
linear probability model. The marginal eﬀects of the policy change derived from
diﬀer little from the linear probability model.
Table 3, column (A0) displays the results of estimating equation (1) for diﬀer 
ent combinations of years without controlling for anticipation. These estimates
show a decrease in the cash out rate prior to the change (represented by a posi 
tive coeﬃcient before the dummy year 2002), a highly signiﬁcant 12.9 percentage
point increase in the probability to take the lump sum as a consequence of the
policy change and a mild recovery of the annuitization rate one year after the
policy was implemented. As outlined before, these estimates overstate the true
21eﬀect of the policy change due to the option to retire early.
The results of a simple proxy variable OLS estimation (Table 4, estimation
P1) do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the more sophisticated proxy estimation
in which the time cost is interacted with the amount of capital in the super 
mandatory part of the second pillar and its square (Table 4, estimation P2). In
the latter, the impact of the simple proxy vanishes as expected, as the cost of
non anticipation is approximately proportional to the length of the anticipation
period multiplied by the magnitude of the beneﬁt.
The proxy variable OLS estimations show a robust increase in the cash out
rate by nearly 8 percentage points as a consequence of the policy change, regard 
less of whether the simple or the interacted proxy is employed. The estimated
coeﬃcient lies within the bounds derived by the simple ad hoc strategy (Table 3)
if only early retirees in December are considered potential anticipators. The ef 
fect exceeds the upper bound if the ad hoc procedure also includes early retirees
from November, but might also be the consequence of the latter strategy’s higher
exposure to falsely identiﬁed anticipators.
Both the period preceding the policy change and the period following the
change do not display any signiﬁcant tendency in the probability to annuitize
retirement wealth, once the impact of the interest rate on the money value of an
annuity have been taken into account (captured by variable PV(income)). Again
this ﬁnding is consistent with the results of the ad hoc strategy.
Other covariates in our estimations show the expected sign and magnitude:
The probability to annuitize is always lowest for individuals with a low capital
stock (presumably as a consequence of the availability of means tested income
support), then increases and reaches a maximum at around 700’000 Swiss francs
and declines with even higher capital stocks. Holding constant the capital stock,
higher income men are more likely to take the lump sum. A possible explanation
for this ﬁnding is that individuals with greater income (and thus higher produc 
tivity) are more likely to take up another job after retirement, which would lessen
their demand for an annuity, not least for tax reasons.
The summary measure for interest rates, PVincome, has the expected negative
sign, once the possibility to retire early is taken into account. An increase in the
mortality adjusted present value of an income stream of 1 for a 65 year old single
man increases the annuitization probability by approximately ﬁve percentage
points. Given that the downward shift in the yield curve from 2004 to 2005
led to an increase in PVincome by approximately 0.8, a sizeable fraction of the
22recovery in annuitization rates from 2004 to 2005 can be explained by the increase
in the annuity’s value.
In the uncorrected estimation, men who retire at age 64 have a much higher
probability to take the annuity than those who retire at age 65. A possible
interpretation for this ﬁnding is that early retirement (to take advantage of the
higher conversion rate) is particularly interesting for men who are close to age
65 at the time of the policy change. The second and third columns of Table 4,
(P1) and (P2), which take into account anticipation, conﬁrm this inference. The
likelihood to cash out retirement balances is higher for individuals under the age
of 63. A possible interpretation for this ﬁnding is that these retirees have liquidity
constraints and take the lump sum to bridge the time until the earliest ﬁrst pillar
beneﬁts are available (from age 63 at an actuarially fair reduction of the beneﬁt).20
Cash out rates are still somewhat higher for 63 and 64 year old retirees, but the
diﬀerence between 63 and 65 year old behavior is considerably smaller and barely
signiﬁcant for the diﬀerence between 64 and 65 year old behavior.
5.3 Parameterized model
To estimate the responsiveness of the annuitization decision with respect to the
change in the annuity value, we regress the variable Option Lump Sum on the
AEW (for diﬀerent levels of risk aversion), a series of year dummies and other
covariates. The results for three coeﬃcients of relative risk aversion are shown
in Table 5. The ﬁrst column (estimation V0) presents the baseline case. The
estimate implies that a one percentage point increase in the AEW increases the
annuitization rate by 0.86 to 1.12 percentage points, depending on the level of
risk aversion. The policy still has a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on the annuitization
rate, but the coeﬃcient is less than half of that compared to speciﬁcation without
AEW.
However, provided that AEW and the Option Lump Sum are certainly corre 
lated with the unobserved anticipation decision, one concern is that these values
are upward biased. In fact, some retirees can choose to increase their AEW by
withdrawing from the work force before the end of 2003. To correct for an 
ticipation eﬀects, we present the results of the proxy variable OLS estimation
(second column of Table 5, estimation V1) . Including a proxy variable reduces
20Recall that the individuals in our sample usually receive a higher beneﬁt from the ﬁrst
pillar than from the second.
23the estimated impact of the AEW. The implied responsiveness of the annuiti 
zation decision with respect to the change in the annuity value is between 0.8
(CRRA=4) and 0.99 (CRRA=0). Furthermore, the eﬀect of the policy change
on the cash out behavior becomes insigniﬁcant, consistent with the idea that the
time cost is good proxy for the anticipation decision: The AEW completely picks
up the eﬀect of the policy change, once the self selection into early retirement is
fully accounted for.
Finally, column 3 (estimation V2) reports the results of the OLS regression in
which the proxy is interacted with the total capital stock and its square. The ef 
fect of the AEW is somewhat smaller than in column 2, but still very sizeable. For
both the risk neutrality (CRRA=0) case and medium risk aversion (CRRA=2)
a one percentage point increase in the AEW results in a 0.88 percentage point
increase in the annuitization rate. For the higher level of risk aversion (CRRA=4)
is amounts to a 0.78 percentage point increase. These estimated values are close
to previous studies despite the fact that these use completely diﬀerent sources
of variation in the AEW, namely diﬀerences across company pension plans and
individual characteristics: They are somewhat lower than the one percent in 
crease in the probabability to annuitize for a one percent increase in the AEW
as reported by Brown (2001) (men and women pooled), but higher than the 0.44
percent estimate for men only reported in Bütler and Teppa (2007).
6 Conclusions
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the ﬁrst to analyze the eﬀects of
a truly exogenous variation in the annuity price on the cash out behavior at
retirement. The annuitization decision is analyzed by exploiting a recent policy
change in which several Swiss insurance companies reduced the conversion rate
at which the retirement capital in the super mandatory part of the second pillar
is translated into a life long annuity by almost 20 percent. Despite the fact that
the administrative data made available by Swiss insurance companies contain
no information on non pension wealth and limited individual information, they
oﬀer many advantages over existing empirical studies. The data set is made up
of real rather than planned annuitization decisions. Individual decisions involve
very large amounts of money (approximately $ 240’000 on average) and some
individuals had to make retirement choices subject to great diﬀerences in prices.
We therefore believe that individuals spend more time in the decision making
24process than answering a questionnaire on hypothetical choices.
The empirical results highlight the importance of the annuity price for the
annuitization decision. As a consequence of the policy change the fraction of
individuals choosing a lump sum increases by approximately 8 percentage points.
This estimate already takes into account that some individuals do not only change
their cash out behavior as a reaction to the change in policy, but also retire earlier
without taking the policy change into account. The two strategies to control for
the anticipation eﬀect, an ad hoc correction of shifting potential anticipators
to their statutory retirement age and an appropriate proxy for the decision to
anticipate retirement deliver consistent results. Once anticipation is properly
taken taken into account, we also ﬁnd constant cash out rates in the periods
before and after the reform.
An annuity provides insurance against the risk of outliving one’s assets in old
age. To accurately measure the impact of the annuity’s value, we compute the an 
nuity equivalent wealth (AEW) within a life cycle framework previously applied
by Brown and Poterba (2000) and Brown (2001). We ﬁnd that a one percentage
point increase in the AEW raises the probability to annuitize by around 0.8 per 
centage points. This responsiveness is slightly lower than in previous empirical
studies by Brown (2001) (for men and women) and somewhat higher than the
corresponding estimate for men only in Bütler and Teppa (2007). Nonetheless,
given that the variation in the annuity’s value diﬀers so much between these
studies, the eﬀect of the annuity’s value on the decision (not) to annuitize seems
remarkably robust across diﬀerent countries, pension plan details and the manner
in which the choice is elicited.
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27A Annuity Equivalent Wealth
We use the methodology of Brown and Poterba (2000) to calculate the AEW,
but adapt it to the Swiss pension system. The AEW approach calculates the
additional wealth an individual would need to be equally well oﬀ without actu 
arially fair annuities in comparison to with actuarially fair annuities. According
to Brown (2001), four main factors are essential to compute the AEW: risk aver 
sion, fraction of pre annuitized total wealth, mortality risk, and marital status.
Unfortunately, we have no information on the marital status of the individuals in
our data set. In the calculation we are assuming that all individuals are married.
This is a reasonable assumption given that in 2003 76 percent of all Swiss men in
the age group 40 64 were married. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that
the composition of our sample with respect to the marital status should diﬀer
systematically in 2003 and in 2004, suggesting that the error in the calculation
of the AEW is similar in both years.
In Brown and Poterba (2000), the couple chooses total consumption, Cc
t,
optimally to maximize an additively separable lifetime utility function. The total
consumption of the couple consists of a weighted combination (with parameter
δ) of the husband’s consumption (superscript m) and that of the wife’s (f).
The utility function exhibits constant relative risk aversion and is a weighted
combination (with parameter ψ) of the utility function of the husband, um(·), and
that of the wife’s, uf(·). We compute the AEW with three diﬀerent coeﬃcients
of relative risk aversion equal to 0, 2 and 4. Since the insurance component of
annuities against the risk of longevity is more pronounced the more risk averse
individuals are, the AEW is increasing in the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion.
Formally, the Bellman equation (only shown for the state in which both mem 
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28subject to the following constraints:
i) W0 given
ii) Wt ≥ 0, ∀ t (7)
iii) Wt+1 = (Wt − C
c




t+1 represent the value functions for the states in which the
male or the female, respectively, is the surviving spouse. Here, Pr[·](t+1) are the
conditional transition probabilities to the diﬀerent states from period t to period
(t + 1). As we do not have any information on non pension wealth, we assume
that the initial wealth, W0, is equivalent to the accumulated second pillar pension
wealth in the mandatory and super mandatory parts K = Kmand + Ksup. St de 
notes ﬁrst pillar beneﬁts, which are paid out from the time of retirement, adjusted
in an actuarially fair manner in the case of early retirement. Bt represents the
sum of occupational beneﬁts if any from the mandatory (Bt,mand = γmandKmand)
and super mandatory part (Bt,sup = γsupKsup). We use a constant annual interest
rate of 3 percent and a rate of time preference of ρ = 0.03.
To compute the AEW we compare two scenarios: In the full annuitization case
the couple’s eligible person annuitizes the entire pension wealth K and reaches a
maximum utility of V ∗. The initial capital W0 is equal to zero. In exchange for
K, (s)he gets a lifelong nominal annuity, Bt = Bt,mand + Bt,sup. If the couple’s
main Claimant should die, the surviving spouse gets a reduced lifelong annuity,
Bt = λ(Bt,mand + Bt,sup) with λ = 0.6. In the full lump sum scenario, the entire
capital stock is cashed out, leaving the couple without any additional beneﬁt from
the second pillar, i.e., Bt = 0. The initial capital is equal to the entire pension
capital, W0 = K. The corresponding utility is V . We then calculate the amount
of additional wealth ∆W the individual must receive in the full lump sum case
to reach the same utility level V ∗ as in the full annuitization scenario.21
V (K + ∆W|Bt = 0, ∀t) = V
∗




21As a robustness check we recalculate the AEW assuming that in the full lump sum scenario
individuals take a lump sum in the super-mandatory part only and choose an annuity for the
mandatory part.
29A.1 Imputation of Super-mandatory capital
One diﬃculty in computing the AEW is given by the fact that we do not observe
the mandatory and super mandatory part separately for individuals that retire
before 2004. We rely on mean imputation as well as regression based imputation
to estimate the super mandatory part for those individuals. In the mean imputa 
tion approach we split the accumulated capital stock of individuals retiring after
the policy change in bins of 20’000 SFR. For each bin we compute the mandatory
and super mandatory capital as a fraction of the total capital stock. These esti 
mated shares can then be used to divide the total accumulated capital stock of
men retiring before the policy change into the mandatory and super mandatory
part. In the regression based imputation we regress the super mandatory capital
on the retirement age, the total capital stock and the earnings in the year prior
to retirement. Since the accumulated capital stock is left censored, we apply a
one sided Tobit model.
30period not aﬀected reform announced reform implemented
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Variable Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Age at retirement 64.7 1.1 64.5 1.2 64.3 1.3 64.5 1.3 64.5 1.2
Conversion rate
Mandatory Part 7.136 0.210 7.104 0.231 7.059 0.256 7.071 0.288 7.029 0.280
Supermandatory Part 7.136 0.210 7.104 0.231 7.059 0.256 5.774 0.153 5.780 0.139
Last Wage 76,232 56,462 78,050 70,853 88,673 86,457 79,687 65,699 79,922 65,133
Capital at retirement 238,850 200,431 235,799 189,342 282,198 225,018 228,548 178,182 238,914 181,249
Mandatory Capital 127,306 52,506 128,695 55,417 137,681 58,344 132,047 63,161 134,952 69,028
Super-mandatory Capital 111,515 173,218 107,088 158,011 144,705 193,272 96,380 154,462 103,962 156,075
Annuity 0.353 0.478 0.330 0.470 0.407 0.491 0.251 0.434 0.334 0.472
Lump Sum 0.616 0.487 0.632 0.482 0.548 0.498 0.730 0.444 0.632 0.482
Mixed 0.031 0.173 0.038 0.191 0.045 0.208 0.019 0.138 0.033 0.180
Observations 976 1,104 1,678 1,080 1,017
Table 1: Summary statistics for men.
3
1comparison comparison comparison comparison
2004-2003 2004-2002 2005-2004 2003-2002
Variable (W1) (W2) (W3) (W4)
Sample: all men
LUi, 0-25 perc. 0.072** 0.041 -0.106** -0.031
(0.035) (0.038) (0.041) (0.034)
LUi, 25-50 perc. 0.057 0.002 -0.053 -0.054
(0.036) (0.039) (0.041) (0.037)
LUi, 50-75 perc. 0.131*** 0.046 -0.100** -0.085***
(0.038) (0.040) (0.042) (0.038)
LUi, 75-100 perc. 0.352*** 0.212*** -0.086** -0.140***
(0.037) (0.041) (0.042) (0.037)
cut-oﬀ values 2002 2003 2004 2005
min 5,603 5,663 0 0
25th 29,013 31,631 8,896 11,514
50th 42,536 45,506 37,968 47,068
75th 116,945 181,553 116,870 130,675
max 1,224,305 1,278,186 1,282,853 1,172,339
Table 2: Before after comparisons by super mandatory retirement capital for men aged 60 and above (no covariates). For
2002 and 2003, super mandatory retirement capital has been imputed (see text). Signiﬁcance levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5%,
* = 10%.
3
2potential anticipaters none retire in dec 2003 retire in dec 2003 retire in nov/dec 2003
strategy: retirement date as observed shifted to age 65 shifted to year 2004 shifted to age 65
strategy: imputed choice No correction lump-sum annuity lump-sum annuity lump-sum annuity
Variable (A0) (A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5) (A6)
No. pot. anticipaters 241 241 241 241 241 303 303
No. shifted 2003 → 2004 0 92 92 241 241 115 115
No. shifted 2003 → 2005 0 53 53 0 0 66 66
LU2004 − LU2003 0.119*** 0.091*** 0.034* 0.113*** -0.023 0.069*** 0.011
(0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
LU2004 − LU2002 0.099*** 0.120*** 0.059** 0.140*** -0.011 0.125*** 0.052**
(0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025)
LU2003 − LU2002 -0.037 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.059** 0.059**
(0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
LU2005 − LU2004 -0.020 0.045 -0.162*** -0.020 -0.027 0.054 -0.183***
(0.043) (0.035) (0.036) (0.042) (0.045) (0.033) (0.035)
Table 3: Non parametrical correction of anticipation eﬀects: Potential anticipaters (annuitants with postive retirement
capital in the super mandatory part retiring early in December (and November) 2003) are shifted to the statutory re 
tirement age or to the year after the policy change. The lower bound for the eﬀect is found by letting them annuitize
even after the policy change, the upper bound by assuming that the anticipaters would have taken the lump sum after
the change. Additional controls: retirement capital and its square, summary measure for interest rates, retirement age
dummies. Signiﬁcance levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%.
3
3uncorrected proxy proxy interacted
Option LS Coef. (Std.) p Coef. (Std.) p Coef. (Std.) p
(P0) (P1) (P2)
Capital (100k)  .088 (.008) ***  .086 (.008) ***  .085 (.008) ***
Capital sq .005 (.001) *** .005 (.001) *** .006 (.001) ***
Wage (100k) .029 (.020) *** .029 (.010) *** .029 (.010) ***
R.A. 60 .033 (.037) .064 (.037) * .060 (.037)
R.A. 61 .062 (.035) * .105 (.034) *** .106 (.033) ***
R.A. 62 .031 (.029) .086 (.030) *** .078 (.029) ***
R.A. 63  .006 (.025) .062 (.026) ** .048 (.025) *
R.A. 64  .106 (.024) ***  .013 (.028)  .014 (.028)
R.As. 66 70 YES YES YES
Post2003 .129 (.019) *** .076 (.020) *** .077 (.020) ***
Y01 .011 (.027)  .051 (.029) *  .052 (.029) *
Y02 .043 (.022) *  .022 (.024)  .022 (.024)
Y05  .058 (.028) **  .037 (.028)  .038 (.028)
PV(Income)  .021 (.024)  .047 (.024) **  .049 (.024) **
Proxy Anticip  .026 (.004) ***  .003 (.005)
Proxy*Sup65  .016 (.003) ***
Proxy*Sup65sq .001 (.000) ***
Annuity max 808k 786k 739k
R squared 0.048 0.057 0.064
No. Obs 5677 5677 5677
Table 4: Linear probability estimates of the lump sum / annuity decision. An 
ticipation eﬀects are corrected using a proxy (last two estimations). Signiﬁcance
levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%.
34uncorrected proxy proxy interacted
Option LS Coef. (Std.) p Coef. (Std.) p Coef. (Std.) p
(V0) (V1) (V2)
none Post2003 .128 (.018) *** .076 (.020) *** .077 (.020) ***
Y01 .011 (.027)  .060 (.029) **  .062 (.029) *
Y02 .043 (.022) *  .023 (.024)  .024 (.024)
Y05  .058 (.028) **  .037 (.028)  .037 (.028)
AEW0  1.117 (.170) ***  .993 (.171) ***  .883 (.172) ***
CRRA=0 Post2003 .049 (.022) ** .011 (.023) .018 (.023)
Y01 .008 (.027)  .056 (.029) *  .057 (.029) **
Y02 .040 (.022) *  .020 (.024)  .021 (.024)
Y05  .071 (.028) **  .051 (.028) *  .049 (.028) *
AEW2  1.013 (.141) ***  .925 (.141) ***  .877 (.142) ***
CRRA=2 Post2003 .050 (.021) ** .010 (.022) .013 (.022)
Y01 .010 (.027)  .055 (.029) *  .056 (.029) *
Y02 .041 (.022) *  .019 (.024)  .020 (.024)
Y05  .072 (.028) **  .052 (.028) *  .051 (.028) *
AEW4  .860 (.122) ***  .795 (.122) ***  .775 (.122) ***
CRRA=4 Post2003 .061 (.021) *** .018 (.022) .020 (.022)
Y01 .011 (.027)  .055 (.029) *  .056 (.029) *
Y02 .043 (.022) *  .019 (.024)  .019 (.024)
Y05  .071 (.028) **  .051 (.028) *  .051 (.028) *
Table 5: Coeﬃcients for measures of Annuity equivalent wealth (AEW with coef 
ﬁcients of relative risk aversion (CRRAs) of 0, 2, and 4) and dummies for policy
change and other years in a linear probability model. Dependent variable is Op 
tion Lump Sum, other covariates include capital and its square, the individual’s
last wage and retirement age dummies. Anticipation eﬀects are corrected using
a proxy (last two columns, as in Table 4). Signiﬁcance levels: *** = 1%, ** =





























































2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Retirement by month
# Retirees (l.s.) Lump−sum − Annuity
Figure 1: Monthly retirement numbers for men, years 2001 2005 (left scale), and





























2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Year
Fraction lump sum Mean conversion rate (age 65)
Mean conversion rate yield−adjusted
Figure 2: Conversion rate (dashed line, right scale) and yield adjusted conversion
rate (normalized to equal the conversion rate in Jan 2001, dotted line, right scale)
both in the super mandatory part, and the percentage of individuals taking the




































































CASE II: Annuity before and after
Figure 3: Potential anticipators forseeing a decrease in the annuity’s value. The
blue line represents the individual’s utility valuation of the lump sum, assumed
to increase with age due to additional contributions. The red line represents the
annuity’s value. Early retirement is anticipated if the annuity’s value just before
the policy change exceeds the annuity’s value or the lump sum, respectively, at
















































Proxy: Benefits of anticipating retirement
Figure 4: Construction of a proxy c for the likelihood of anticipating early re 
tirement in light of the decrease in the annuity’s value. The base proxy c is zero
for individuals who reach the statutory retirement age before the reform and is
maximal for those who turn 65 just after the policy change.
39CESifo Working Paper Series 
for full list see Twww.cesifo-group.org/wpT 
(address: Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany, office@cesifo.de) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2313 Ronel Elul and Piero Gottardi, Bankruptcy: Is it enough to Forgive or must we also 
Forget?, May 2008 
 
2314 Andreas Irmen and Johanna Kuehnel, Productive Government Expenditure and 
Economic Growth, May 2008 
 
2315 Beate Henschel, Carsten Pohl and Marcel Thum, Demographic Change and Regional 
Labour Markets: The Case of Eastern Germany, May 2008 
 
2316 Gabriel Felbermayr, Wido Geis and Wilhelm Kohler, Restrictive Immigration Policy in 
Germany: Pains and Gains Foregone?, May 2008 
 
2317 Michael Hofmann, Gerhard Kempkes and Helmut Seitz, Demographic Change and 
Public Sector Budgets in a Federal System, May 2008 
 
2318 Paul De Grauwe, Macroeconomic Modeling when Agents are Imperfectly Informed, 
June 2008 
 
2319 Johann K. Brunner and Susanne Pech, Optimum Taxation of Inheritances, June 2008 
 
2320 Thomas Eichner and Marco Runkel, Corporate Income Taxation of Multinationals in a 
General Equilibrium Model, June 2008 
 
2321 Rainald Borck and Matthias Wrede, Subsidies for Intracity and Intercity Commuting, 
June 2008 
 
2322 Patricia Apps and Ray Rees, Testing the Pareto Efficiency of Household Resource 
Allocations, June 2008 
 
2323 Amihai Glazer, Vesa Kanniainen and Panu Poutvaara, Firms’ Ethics, Consumer 
Boycotts, and Signalling, June 2008 
 
2324 Claudia M. Buch, Jörg Döpke and Kerstin Stahn, Great Moderation at the Firm Level? 
Unconditional vs. Conditional Output Volatility, June 2008 
 
2325 Helmuth Cremer, Philippe De Donder, Dario Maldonado and Pierre Pestieau, Forced 
Saving, Redistribution and Nonlinear Social Security Schemes, June 2008 
 
2326 M. Hashem Pesaran and Paolo Zaffaroni, Optimal Asset Allocation with Factor Models 
for Large Portfolios, June 2008 
 
2327 Harald Badinger and Peter Egger, Horizontal versus Vertical Interdependence in 
Multinational Activity, June 2008 
 
  
2328 Jan K. Brueckner and Harris Selod, A Theory of Urban Squatting and Land-Tenure 
Formalization in Developing Countries, June 2008 
 
2329 Paolo M. Panteghini, Corporate Debt, Hybrid Securities and the Effective Tax Rate, 
June 2008 
 
2330 Guglielmo Maria Caporale, Juncal Cuñado and Luis A. Gil-Alana, Modelling Long-Run 
Trends and Cycles in Financial Time Series Data, June 2008 
 
2331 Avi Ben-Bassat and Momi Dahan, Social Identity and Voter Turnout, June 2008 
 
2332 Martin R. West and Ludger Wößmann, “Every Catholic Child in a Catholic School”: 
Historical Resistance to State Schooling, Contemporary Private Competition, and 
Student Achievement across Countries, June 2008 
 
2333 Erkki Koskela and Panu Poutvaara, Outsourcing and Labor Taxation in Dual Labor 
Markets, June 2008 
 
2334 Philippe Choné and Laurent Linnemer, Optimal Litigation Strategies with Signaling and 
Screening, June 2008 
 
2335 Albert Solé-Ollé and Pilar Sorribas-Navarro, Does Partisan Alignment Affect the 
Electoral Reward of Intergovernmental Transfers?, June 2008 
 
2336 Antonio Cabrales and Piero Gottardi, Markets for Information: Of Inefficient Firewalls 
and Efficient Monopolies, June 2008 
 
2337 Sumon Majumdar and Sharun W. Mukand, The Leader as Catalyst – on Leadership and 
the Mechanics of Institutional Change, June 2008 
 
2338 Ulrich Hange, Tax Competition, Elastic Labor Supply, and Growth, June 2008 
 
2339 Guy Laroque and Bernard Salanié, Does Fertility Respond to Financial Incentives?, 
June 2008 
 
2340 Adriano Paggiaro, Enrico Rettore and Ugo Trivellato, The Effect of Extending the 
Duration of Eligibility in an Italian Labour Market Programme for Dismissed Workers, 
June 2008 
 
2341 Helmut Seitz, Minimum Standards, Fixed Costs and Taxing Autonomy of Subnational 
Governments, June 2008 
 
2342 Robert S. Chirinko, Leo de Haan and Elmer Sterken, Asset Price Shocks, Real 
Expenditures, and Financial Structure: A Multi-Country Analysis, July 2008 
 
2343 Wolfgang Leininger, Evolutionarily Stable Preferences in Contests, July 2008 
 
2344 Hartmut Egger and Udo Kreickemeier, Fairness, Trade, and Inequality, July 2008 
 
  
2345 Ngo Van Long and Bodhisattva Sengupta, Yardstick Competition, Corruption, and 
Electoral Incentives, July 2008 
 
2346 Florian Baumann, Employment Protection: The Case of Limited Enforceability, July 
2008 
 
2347 Alessandro Balestrino, Cinzia Ciardi and Claudio Mammini, On the Causes and 
Consequences of Divorce, July 2008 
 
2348 Dirk Schindler and Benjamin Weigert, Insuring Educational Risk: Opportunities versus 
Income, July 2008 
 
2349 Lammertjan Dam and Ben J. Heijdra, The Environmental and Macroeconomic Effects 
of Socially Responsible Investment, July 2008 
 
2350 Avner Greif, Contract Enforcement and Institutions among the Maghribi Traders: 
Refuting Edwards and Ogilvie, July 2008 
 
2351 Helmuth Cremer, Philippe De Donder, Dario Maldonado and Pierre Pestieau, Habit 
Formation and Labor Supply, July 2008 
 
2352 Francesco Menoncin and Paolo M. Panteghini, The Johansson-Samuelson Theorem in 
General Equilibrium: A Rebuttal, July 2008 
 
2353 Michael Kaganovich and Itzhak Zilcha, Alternative Social Security Systems and 
Growth, July 2008 
 
2354 Keith Blackburn, Kyriakos C. Neanidis and M. Emranul Haque, Corruption, 
Seigniorage and Growth: Theory and Evidence, July 2008 
 
2355 Edward Castronova, A Test of the Law of Demand in a Virtual World: Exploring the 
Petri Dish Approach to Social Science, July 2008 
 
2356 Harald Badinger and Peter Egger, GM Estimation of Higher-Order Spatial 
Autoregressive Processes in Cross-Section Models with Heteroskedastic Disturbances, 
July 2008 
 
2357 Wolfgang Buchholz and Jan Schumacher, Discounting the Long-Distant Future: A 
Simple Explanation for the Weitzman-Gollier-Puzzle, July 2008 
 
2358 Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Alessandro Riboni, Statute Law or Case Law?, July 
2008 
 
2359 Guglielmo Maria Caporale, Davide Ciferri and Alessandro Girardi, Are the Baltic 
Countries Ready to Adopt the Euro? A Generalised Purchasing Power Parity Approach, 
July 2008 
 
2360 Erkki Koskela and Ronnie Schöb, Outsourcing of Unionized Firms and the Impacts of 
Labour Market Policy Reforms, July 2008 
  
2361 Francisco Alvarez-Cuadrado and Ngo Van Long, A Permanent Income Version of the 
Relative Income Hypothesis, July 2008 
 
2362 Gabrielle Demange, Robert Fenge and Silke Uebelmesser, Financing Higher Education 
and Labor Mobility, July 2008 
 
2363 Alessandra Casarico and Alessandro Sommacal, Labor Income Taxation, Human 
Capital and Growth: The Role of Child Care, August 2008 
 
2364 Antonis Adam, Manthos D. Delis and Pantelis Kammas, Fiscal Decentralization and 
Public Sector Efficiency: Evidence from OECD Countries, August 2008 
 
2365 Stefan Voigt, The (Economic) Effects of Lay Participation in Courts – A Cross-Country 
Analysis, August 2008 
 
2366 Tobias König and Andreas Wagener, (Post-)Materialist Attitudes and the Mix of Capital 
and Labour Taxation, August 2008 
 
2367 Ximing Wu, Andreas Savvides and Thanasis Stengos, The Global Joint Distribution of 
Income and Health, August 2008 
 
2368 Alejandro Donado and Klaus Wälde, Trade Unions Go Global!, August 2008 
 
2369 Hans Gersbach and Hans Haller, Exit and Power in General Equilibrium, August 2008 
 
2370 Jan P.A.M. Jacobs and Jan-Egbert Sturm, The Information Content of KOF Indicators 
on Swiss Current Account Data Revisions, August 2008 
 
2371 Oliver Hülsewig, Johannes Mayr and Timo Wollmershäuser, Forecasting Euro Area 
Real GDP: Optimal Pooling of Information, August 2008 
 
2372 Tigran Poghosyan and Jakob de Haan, Determinants of Cross-Border Bank Acquisitions 
in Transition Economies: A Latent Class Analysis, August 2008 
 
2373 David Anthoff and Richard S.J. Tol, On International Equity Weights and National 
Decision Making on Climate Change, August 2008 
 
2374 Florian Englmaier and Arno Schmöller, Reserve Price Formation in Online Auctions, 
August 2008 
 
2375 Karl Farmer, Birgit Friedl and Andreas Rainer, Effects of Unilateral Climate Policy on 
Terms of Trade, Capital Accumulation, and Welfare in a World Economy, August 2008 
 
2376 Monika Bütler, Stefan Staubli and Maria Grazia Zito, The Role of the Annuity’s Value 
on the Decision (Not) to Annuitize: Evidence from a Large Policy Change, August 2008 